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PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS: DEFINING THE ELUSIVE 
TRADEMARK-COPYRIGHT DIVIDE  
KATHRYN M. FOLEY 
Fictional characters have become exceptionally valuable assets, now 
consistently the subject of lucrative licensing agreements.  Their unique 
ability to serve expressive as well as source identifying functions supports 
such agreements by allowing strong intellectual property protection to be 
granted under both copyright and trademark doctrines.  Nonetheless, the 
intellectual property protection afforded to fictional characters must be 
carefully considered in order to avoid unjustified encroachments upon the 
public domain.  This Article examines the copyright and trademark 
protection available to fictional characters and offers a mechanism for 
ensuring that such protection does not lead to the creation of 
impermissible, perpetual copyrights.  The protection available to fictional 
characters under copyright law is discussed at length, with a particular 
focus on the various standards of copyrightability.  This Article also 
evaluates the protection available under trademark law, emphasizing the 
ability of general public recognition to distort the trademark analysis.  
Finally, in examining the broader consequences of providing both 
copyright and trademark protection to fictional characters, this Article 
proposes that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox be explicitly incorporated into the trademark analysis for 
fictional characters.  Careful adherence to the principals of Dastar will 
substantially improve the quality of trademark protection provided to 
fictional characters, thereby ensuring that any encroachment upon the 
public domain is in fact justified.    
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 PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS: DEFINING THE ELUSIVE 
TRADEMARK-COPYRIGHT DIVIDE  
KATHRYN M. FOLEY∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For over ninety years, Forbes has kept tabs on the rich, famous and 
infamous.  From Bill Gates to Will Smith to General Electric, Forbes 
routinely calculates the net worth of billionaires, movie stars and Fortune 
500 companies.1  In 2002, Forbes added a new dimension to its collection 
of rankings, the Forbes Fictional Fifteen.2  The Forbes Fictional Fifteen 
employs an enchanted formula reflecting both real-world and animated-
world values to calculate the net worth of our favorite fictional characters.3  
The top breadwinner for 2007 was Walt Disney’s own, Scrooge McDuck.4  
The uncle of Donald Duck, Scrooge McDuck was estimated to have a net 
worth of over $28.8 billion.5  
As bizarre as the Forbes Fictional Fifteen and its champion Scrooge 
McDuck may first appear, this imaginary list resonates with real world 
implications.  Fictional characters have moved far beyond the traditional 
boundaries of books and magazines, landing on movie screens, television 
sets, video games, stuffed animals and Happy Meals®.  Fictional characters 
have become such valuable assets that the licensing of Walt Disney 
characters alone generates nearly $20 billion a year in retail sales.6  Not 
surprisingly, the intellectual property protection available to fictional 
characters has expanded remarkably, in close parallel with their substantial 
rise in economic value. 
This Article analyzes the intellectual property protection of fictional 
characters.  Part II examines the protection available under copyright law.  
                                                                                                                          
∗ University of Connecticut, Doctor of Pharmacy 2006; University of Connecticut School of Law, 
J.D. Candidate 2009.  I would like to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for his insightful comments 
and guidance.  This Note is dedicated to my family for their constant support and encouragement 
throughout my academic career.      
1 See, e.g., Lea Goldman, The Celebrity 100, FORBES, July 2, 2007, at 82; Matthew Miller, The 
Forbes 400 List of Billionaires, FORBES, Oct. 8, 2007, at 72; Stewart Pinkerton, America’s 400 Best 
Big Companies, FORBES, Jan. 7, 2008, at 97.   
2 Michael Noer, The Forbes Fictional Fifteen, FORBES.COM, Sept. 13, 2002, http://www.forbes. 
com/2002/09/13/400fictional.html. 
3 Id.  
4 Michael Noer, The Forbes Fictional Fifteen, FORBES.COM, Dec. 12, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/11/richest-fictional-characters-oped-books-fict1507-
cx_mn_de_1211fictional15_land.html.  
5 Id.  
6 Andrea K. Walker, The Allure of SpongeBob, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 29, 2006, at 1D, available 
at LEXIS, News Library, BALSUN File.  
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Particular attention is paid to the development of different standards of 
copyrightability, including the weaknesses of early standards and the 
eventual convergence of circuit splits to standards similar in principal, if 
not in name.  Part III evaluates the trademark protection available to 
fictional characters, emphasizing the ability of public recognition to warp 
the trademark analysis.  Several methods for limiting the influence of a 
character’s popularity are proposed, including separating the trademark 
analysis into its constituent parts and focusing on those areas where 
fictional characters often fail to meet the statutory requirements for 
protection.7   
Part IV of this Article examines the broader consequences of providing 
both copyright and trademark protection to fictional characters.  This 
section assesses the influence of trademark protection on the copyright fair 
use analysis as well as the value of providing trademark protection after the 
expiration of a copyright term.  Part V proposes that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox be explicitly 
incorporated into the trademark analysis of fictional characters.8  Careful 
adherence to the holding of Dastar will appropriately shift the trademark 
analysis away from a character’s general popularity and instead focus the 
analysis on the statutory requirements of trademark law, improving the 
quality of trademark protection and mitigating the potential negative 
effects of providing both copyright and trademark protection.9  
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
Copyright law reflects a carefully crafted bargain wherein authors are 
provided certain exclusive rights, for a limited time, to incentivize the 
creation of new works of authorship and enrich the public domain.10  On 
one hand, copyright protection affords authors the ability to control the use 
of their artistic creations, including the exclusive right to reproduce and 
perform the work, as well as the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works for the duration of the copyright term.11  On the other hand, the 
public retains the right to make fair use of the work, as well as the right to 
                                                                                                                          
7 See infra text accompanying notes 204–05. 
8 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (defining the term 
“origin of goods” in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act to refer “[only] to the producer of the tangible goods 
that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in 
those goods”); see text accompanying notes 257–71.   
9 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35–38.  
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the authority “[t]o promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and inventors the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries”); see Rockford Map Publishers v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 
F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The copyright laws are designed to give people incentives to produce 
new works.  They allow people to collect the reward for their contributions.”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
11 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302 (2000). 
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copy the work once it falls into the public domain.12  The copyright bargain 
is “predicated upon the premises that the public benefits from the creative 
activities of authors” and assumes, that in the absence of public benefit, the 
grant of copyright protection would be unjustified.13     
Copyright protection provides authors with a legal mechanism to 
control the use and exploitation of the characters they create.14  It allows 
authors to reap the benefits of their creative labor, influence the 
development of their characters in subsequent works, and inhibit others 
from misappropriating their intellectual property—the fictional characters 
themselves.15  Yet, underlying this concept of copyright protection for 
fictional characters is the assumption that a fictional character is deserving 
of copyright protection separate from the original work in which the 
character first appears.  This issue is most relevant in instances where a 
fictional character is merely one aspect of a larger work, such as a book or 
movie that is itself subject to copyright protection.  While at first glance it 
may appear unnecessarily duplicative to provide separate copyright 
protection to fictional characters, a closer look reveals that separate 
protection is necessary both to protect the underlying work, and to protect 
the character—itself an original work of authorship.  For instance, if 
Mickey Mouse was not subject to copyright protection separate from the 
original cartoon in which he first appeared, Walt Disney would not have 
                                                                                                                          
12 Id. § 107.  
13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (1990).  
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case 
of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.”). 
15 17 U.S.C. § 106.  In 1964, despite the increasing economic value of fictional characters, the 
Register of Copyrights refused to create a specific subject matter category for fictional characters.  The 
Register of Copyrights stated: “As is equally true in the case of detailed presentations of plot setting, or 
dramatic action, we believe it would be unnecessary and misleading to specify fictional characters as a 
separate class of copyrightable works.”  NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12.  Nonetheless, the 1976 
revision of the Copyright Act considerably expanded the scope of copyrightable subject matter to 
include “all original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”  17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2006).  The revision also enumerated seven categories of works of authorship.  Id. § 102(a).  While 
fictional characters were not explicitly listed as works of authorship, courts have routinely found 
fictional characters to fall within the statutory categories of the 1976 Act.  See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. 
Kenner Prods. Div., 443 F. Supp. 291, 296, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding it “clear that a copyright in a 
dramatic work such as a movie or a play can extend to cover the characters contained therein . . . .”).  
The subsequent failure of Congress to legislatively overrule the numerous cases establishing copyright 
protection in fictional characters provides further indication that copyright protection of fictional 
characters is consistent with the Copyright Act.  See Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 
121 (2d Cir. 1930) (granting, for the first time, a separate copyright to a fictional character). 
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retained a meaningful, exclusive right to create derivative works.  Instead, 
the public could have created an infinite number of works embodying the 
Mickey Mouse character outside of the original cartoon, and the Walt 
Disney empire would have been effectively halted at Steamboat Willie.16  
Furthermore, Mickey Mouse presents a strong case for the argument that 
even when a fictional character appears in an underlying work subject to 
copyright protection, the fictional character itself remains an original work 
of authorship, and a proper subject of individual copyright protection.  
Mickey Mouse is certainly more than a component part of Steamboat 
Willie.  Mickey Mouse is a separate entity, deserving of separate copyright 
protection.         
Providing copyright protection to fictional characters is not without 
cost.  The Supreme Court recognized an “inherent tension in the need [to] 
simultaneously protect copyright material and to allow others to build upon 
it”17  Many great characters have been borrowed directly from the works of 
others, and numerous characters have found new life in subsequent 
works.18   For instance, in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead, the 
author builds a storyline around two obscure characters taken directly from 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.19  In Mary Reilly, the author imaginatively retells 
the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde from the point of view of the doctor’s 
maid.20  “The creations of others are the building blocks of commerce as 
well as art.  Progress relies on a general indulgence of copying . . . .”21  The 
copyright bargain thereby provides exclusive rights to authors with the 
understanding that the protected works will ultimately serve to enrich the 
public domain. 
The development of copyright protection for fictional characters has 
been riddled with uncertainty and inconsistency as courts have struggled to 
fit fictional characters into the rubric of copyright law.22  In part, as a 
response to this uncertainty, the copyright infringement analysis of 
fictional characters has evolved into a two-part inquiry.23  As a threshold 
                                                                                                                          
16 Jesse Green, Building a Better Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at 1, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File.  
17 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).  
18 Shakespeare, Moliere, Spenser, Byron, Dickens, Rabelais and Hugo have all made significant 
use of the works of others in the creation of their characters.  See ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM 
AND ORIGINALITY 35, 60, 62–63, 86, 89 (1952). 
19 TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1967).  
20 VALERIE MARTIN, MARY REILLY (1990). 
21 Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429, 
438 (1986).  Justice Story noted “no man who put pen to paper labored unaided and uninstructed.  
Every writer borrowed and had to borrow; his thoughts were a combination of what others had thought 
and expressed before him, modified or exalted by his own genius.”  LINDEY, supra note 18, at 20. 
22 See infra notes 23–76 and accompanying text. 
23 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995) (“A claim for copyright infringement requires that the plaintiff prove (1) its ownership of 
the copyright in a particular [character], and (2) the defendant’s copying of a substantial, legally 
protectable portion of such [character].”).  
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matter, a court first determines whether the fictional character is a proper 
subject of copyright.24  Only after a character is found to be worthy of 
individual copyright protection does the court engage in the second 
inquiry, evaluating the infringing work for substantial similarity.25 
A.  The Distinct Delineation Standard   
The first prong of the copyright infringement inquiry, determining 
whether a fictional character is a proper subject of copyright, has proven to 
be a significant challenge for courts.  One important standard for 
evaluating this issue, the distinct delineation standard, originated in the 
1930 decision Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.26  In Nichols, the 
plaintiff alleged that Universal’s film, The Cohens and the Kellys, 
infringed upon the plot and character of her play, Abie’s Irish Rose.27  In 
analyzing the case, Judge Learned Hand established for the first time that a 
fictional character could be protected “quite independently of the plot.”28  
Nevertheless, Judge Hand was careful to emphasize the limited nature of 
copyright protection available to fictional characters, stating: 
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible 
that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch 
or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for 
one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept 
wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and 
foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress.  These 
would be no more than Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in the play, as 
little capable of monopoly as Einstein’s Doctrine of 
Relativity, or Darwin’s theory of the Origin of Species.  It 
follows that the less developed the characters, the less they 
can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear 
for marking them too indistinctly.29    
Judge Hand was obviously concerned with establishing a copyright 
analysis for fictional characters that protected original expression yet left 
the ideas embodied in characters to the public domain.  The distinct 
delineation standard is an attempt to strike this balance, resting upon the 
assumption that “the more developed a character is, the more it embodies 
                                                                                                                          
24 Id. at 1296 (finding, for the first time, the James Bond character to be a proper subject of 
copyright protection).  
25 Id. at 1297, 1299 (finding the defendant’s work to be substantially similar to the protectable 
James Bond character).  
26 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).   
27 Id. at 120, 122. 
28 Id. at 121. 
29 Id.  
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expression and less a general idea.”30  Judge Hand ultimately found that the 
characters of Abie’s Irish Rose were not sufficiently delineated to merit 
copyright protection.31  As a result, the threshold of “distinct delineation” 
that would be required to provide copyright protection to fictional 
characters in the future remained undefined.     
In Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, the Second Circuit 
struggled to define the degree of delineation necessary to meet the “distinct 
delineation” threshold.32  Detective Comics sued Bruns Publications for 
infringement of the fictional character Superman.33  The court reasoned 
that so long as “the pictorial representations and verbal descriptions of 
‘Superman’ are not a mere delineation of a benevolent Hercules, but 
embody an arrangement of incidents and literary expressions original with 
the author, they are proper subjects of copyright and susceptible to 
infringement.”34  Finding Superman to embody such original expression, 
and therefore to be a proper subject of copyright protection under the 
distinct delineation standard, the court went on to the second prong of the 
infringement analysis, evaluating the similarity between Superman and the 
allegedly infringing character, Wonderman.35  The court determined that 
Wonderman was infringing, as it was “plain that the defendants have used 
more than general types and ideas and have appropriated the pictorial and 
literary details embodied in the complainant’s copyrights.”36  
The Detective Comics court was additionally concerned that providing 
an inappropriate level of protection, once a valid copyright had been 
established, would unnecessarily “limit the raw materials available to 
authors in the public domain.”37  The district court had granted an 
injunction forbidding the publication of Wonderman in any form that 
would “trespass in any respect” on the Superman character.38  The Second 
Circuit found that such a sweeping injunction would improperly entitle the 
plaintiffs to a monopoly on any character who was “a blessing to 
mankind,” and therefore the court limited the injunction to prohibit only 
the use of  “feats of strength or powers performed by ‘Superman’ or 
closely imitating his costume or appearance . . . .”39  Thus, even where a 
character is found to be a proper subject of copyright and infringement is 
                                                                                                                          
30 Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters that Constitute the Story Being 
Told: Who are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection, 8 VAND. J. ENT. L. & 
PRAC. 365, 370 (2006).  
31 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121–22.   
32 Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940).  
33 Id. at 433. 
34 Id. at 433–34. 
35 Id. at 433.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 434.  
38 Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D.C.N.Y. 1939), rev’d, 
111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).  
39 Detective Comics, 111 F.2d at 434. 
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established, the pursuing injunction must be limited to the original 
expressions of the author if the ideas underlying the character are to remain 
in the public domain.   
While Detective Comics involved a relatively straightforward 
application of the distinct delineation standard, it still presents many of the 
complexities and uncertainties inherent in the analysis.  Detective Comics 
illustrates that there is no precise mechanism for deciding when a 
character, particularly a literary character, has reached the threshold of 
distinct delineation.  It also illustrates the difficulties attendant to designing 
and enforcing an injunction.  
B.  The Story Being Told Test 
Perhaps out of frustration with the ambiguity inherent in the Nichols 
distinct delineation standard, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own standard 
for analyzing the copyrightability of fictional characters—the story being 
told test.40  In Warner Brothers v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 
Hammett, the author of The Maltese Falcon, assigned to Warner Brothers 
the exclusive right to the writings of The Maltese Falcon.41  Later, 
Hammett assigned the exclusive right to the characters of The Maltese 
Falcon, including Detective Sam Spade, to CBS.42  Warner Brothers 
subsequently sued CBS, believing that its exclusive right to the writings of 
The Maltese Falcon included the exclusive right to the Detective Sam 
Spade character.43   
In analyzing whether fictional characters could be proper subjects of 
copyright protection, the Ninth Circuit found it “conceivable that the 
character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only 
the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of 
the protection afforded by copyright.”44  Detective Sam Spade was not 
found to constitute the “story being told,” and therefore was not subject to 
copyright protection and had not been assigned to Warner Brothers.45  The 
court emphasized that “[t]he characters were vehicles for the story told, 
and the vehicles did not go with the sale of the story.”46  As such, the use 
of the Sam Spade character by CBS did not infringe Warner Brothers’ 
exclusive right to the writings of The Maltese Falcon.47  
The Warner Brothers “story being told” test is often criticized.  
                                                                                                                          
40 Mark Bartholomew, Protecting the Performers: Setting a New Standard for Character 
Copyrightability, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 341, 347 (2001).  
41 Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 1954). 
42 Id. at 948.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 950 (emphasis added). 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 950–51.  
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Nimmer describes the test as “much too restrictive . . . seeming to envisage 
a story devoid of plot, wherein character study constitutes all or 
substantially all of the work.”48  Other scholars have noted that 
“[i]ronically, while the rule articulated in [Warner Brothers] protected 
Hammett’s right to reuse his characters, the rule potentially relegated all 
fictional characters to the public domain.”49  Presumably as a result of this 
potential to eliminate copyright protection for the vast majority of fictional 
characters, the “story being told” test has never been generally accepted.  
The Ninth Circuit itself has backed away from a strict application of the 
test, limiting it in certain instances and failing to apply it in others.50  
Numerous courts have declined to adopt the “story being told” test, 
describing it as mere dicta,51 while others have significantly distorted its 
meaning.52  Even more, some courts have expressed such uncertainty as to 
the state of the law that they analyze the copyrightability of fictional 
characters under both the “story being told” test and the “distinct 
delineation” standard to avoid reversal.53 
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit significantly limited the scope of the “story 
being told” test in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.54  Walt Disney 
sued Air Pirates claiming that its use of Disney characters in underground 
“counter-culture” magazines constituted copyright infringement.55  Air 
Pirates argued that fictional characters are “never copyrightable and 
therefore cannot in any way constitute a copyrightable component part” 
subject to separate copyright protection.56  The Ninth Circuit addressed 
these infringement arguments by reviewing its own decision in Warner 
Brothers, acknowledging that Warner Brothers “lends some support to the 
                                                                                                                          
48 NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 9.12.  
49 David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in 
Copyright Protection, 78 CAL. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990).  
50 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1978) (describing the 
story being told test as “arguably dicta” yet declining to decide the continuing validity of the test, 
finding that regardless of the outcome, lightly sketched characters could form the basis of an 
infringement action); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (“Subsequent 
decisions in the Ninth Circuit cast doubt on the reasoning and implicitly limit the holding of the Sam 
Spade case.”).  
51 See Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding the 
story being told test to constitute mere dicta, adding that “such a conclusion would be clearly untenable 
from the standpoint of public policy, for it would effectively permit the unrestrained pilfering of 
characters”). 
52 Zecevic, supra note 30, at 372. 
53 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 
1995) (“[I]t behooves this Court to analyze James Bond’s status under the Sam Spade/Olson/Ninth 
Circuit ‘story being told’ test, as well as under the Air Pirates/Second Circuit ‘character delineation 
test.’”); Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1166  (“[O]ut of an abundance of caution this Court will determine 
the protectability of the Rocky characters under both tests.”).  The Anderson court ultimately held that 
the characters of the Rocky movies constituted the story being told and were sufficiently delineated to 
warrant copyright protection.  Id. at 1166–67.  
54 Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 755. 
55 Id. at 752.  
56 Id. at 754. 
 2009] PROTECTING FICTIONAL CHARACTERS 931 
position that characters ordinarily are not copyrightable.”57  The court then 
turned to a brief discussion of the “distinct delineation” standard developed 
by the Second Circuit.58  In the end, the court held that where an author 
adds a visual image, the difficulties associated with creating a distinctly 
delineated character are reduced, and therefore the story being told test is 
unnecessary for visually depicted characters.59  Yet, despite reviewing the 
distinct delineation standard and recognizing a new standard for visually 
depicted characters, the Ninth Circuit failed to specifically address the 
continuing validity of the “story being told” test for literary characters.60   
In Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., the Ninth Circuit attempted to 
address the impact of the Air Pirates decision on the traditional “story 
being told” test.61  The Olson case involved allegations that the characters 
of the NBC television series, The A-Team, infringed upon Olson’s 
copyright in the characters of a pilot television script, Cargo.62  The court 
recognized that “cases subsequent to Warner Brothers have allowed 
copyright protection for characters who are especially distinctive,” citing 
Air Pirates, and reaffirming the distinction between visually depicted 
characters and purely literary characters.63  Nonetheless, the court 
explicitly declined the opportunity to “resolve the issue left open in Air 
Pirates [as to] whether the Warner Bros. statements should be considered 
dicta.”64  Thus, the Ninth Circuit did not go so far as to overrule Warner 
Brothers or to adopt the distinct delineation standard, instead referring to 
the distinct delineation standard as merely one of the “more lenient 
standards adopted elsewhere,” and eventually holding that the characters of 
Cargo failed to qualify for protection under either the “story being told” 
test or the “distinct delineation” standard.65  
Notwithstanding Olson’s discussion of Air Pirates and the distinct 
delineation standard, subsequent courts have found that Olson “did little to 
clarify Air Pirates’ impact on the [story being told] test.”66  One district 
court found “[t]he precise legal standard this Court should apply in 
determining when a character may be afforded copyright protection [to be] 
fraught with uncertainty,”67 and interpreted Olson as an “implicit 
                                                                                                                          
57 Id. at 755.   
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Feldman, supra note 49, at 694; see also NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12 (suggesting that Air 
Pirates limited the Sam Spade test to the realm of “word portraits” of literary characters).  
61 Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988). 
62 Id. at 1447–48. 
63 Id. at 1452.  
64 Id. at 1452 n.7. 
65 Id. at 1452–53. 
66 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1295 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
67 Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1989).  
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acknowledgment of the unsettled state of the law.”68  As a result of this 
uncertainty, courts following Ninth Circuit precedent have generally 
proceeded to analyze fictional character copyright claims under the Ninth 
Circuit’s Warner Brothers/Olson “story being told” test, as well as the 
Second Circuit’s Nichols “distinct delineation” standard.69  
More recently, in Gaiman v. McFarlane, Judge Posner pronounced 
that the Warner Brothers decision was “wrong,” and that the “Ninth 
Circuit had killed the decision” with Olson and Air Pirates.70  Gaiman 
brought suit seeking a declaration that he jointly owned copyrights in the 
characters of the comic book Spawn, including Cogliostro and Medieval 
Spawn.71  While McFarlane had created the first, unsuccessful issues of 
Spawn, Gaiman had developed the storyline and created the Cogliostro and 
Medieval Spawn characters in later, more successful issues.72  McFarlane 
argued that the characters were mere “scenes a fair” and thus too 
commonplace to be proper subjects of copyright and jointly owned by 
Gaiman.73  Judge Posner analyzed the copyrightability of the fictional 
characters under a standard reminiscent of Nichols, finding that where a 
character has a specific name and a specific appearance “[n]o more is 
required for a character copyright.”74  Under this standard, both Cogliostro 
and Medieval Spawn were proper subjects of copyright protection.  
Gaiman thereby lends support to Nimmer’s theory that “although there is 
some conflict in the cases, it is clearly the prevailing view that visual 
characters are per se entitled to copyright protection.”75  Gaiman is also 
illustrative of both the recent trend away from the story being told test and 
the general, unsettled nature of copyright law with regards to fictional 
characters.     
C.  Visually Depicted Characters  
Visually depicted characters have had a considerably smoother road to 
copyright protection than their purely literary counterparts.76  The presence 
of a visual image removes many of the concerns courts have expressed 
                                                                                                                          
68 Id. at 1166. 
69 Id.    
70 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). 
71 Id. at 648, 651. 
72 Id. at 649, 651. 
73 Id. at 659. 
74 Id. at 660 (recognizing that even if the Warner Brothers decision was correct and binding 
authority in the Seventh Circuit it would not apply in this case because there is a real “difference 
between literary and graphic expression”). 
75 NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12.  However, Nimmer also recognized that purely literary 
characters may not be entitled to copyright protection per se, instead requiring a more detailed analysis 
to determine copyrightablility.  Id.  
76 See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding copyright 
protection for the visual representation of the Superman character).  
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when evaluating more intangible literary characters.  A visual image 
provides the court with a concrete representation of the character, thereby 
avoiding the difficult task of delving into the work of authorship and 
defining the character for purposes of legal analysis.77    A visual image 
also provides the court with a defined starting point for evaluating 
substantial similarity.  Taken together, these significant advantages result 
in courts generally accepting that the visual representation of a character is 
per se entitled to copyright protection.78   
Historically, the protection afforded to visually depicted characters has 
been limited by strict requirements for copyrightability.79  In 1914, the 
Southern District of New York recognized the copyrightability of cartoon 
characters in Hill v. Whalen & Martell.80  In Hill, the creator of the 
characters Mutt and Jeff sued the defendant for use of the characters Nutt 
and Giff in a stage production entitled, In Cartoonland. 81  To sustain a 
finding of copyright infringement, the court noted that Nutt and Giff “were 
Mutt and Jeff,” as the defendant’s characters presented similar appearances 
and speech and were recognized by the audience as the plaintiff’s 
characters.82 
While cases such as Hill reinforced the general idea that a cartoon 
character may be a proper subject of copyright protection, these early cases 
failed to answer a number of significant questions, including whether a 
cartoon character could be protected apart from its original work and if 
visual similarity alone, in the absence of characterization or elements of the 
plot, would be sufficient to sustain a claim of infringement.83  As fictional 
characters are “agile creatures” with an ability to exist in different forms 
and in different works, the answers to these questions are vitally important 
to defining the scope of protection available to visually depicted 
characters.84  
As early as the 1930’s, courts began to consider whether copyright 
protection might be extended to the use of a character apart from any 
aspect of the plot of the original work in which the character first appeared.  
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures, the court suggested that copying a 
character outside of the “plot proper” might be sufficient to establish 
                                                                                                                          
77 Leslie A. Kurtz, The Methuselah Factor: When Characters Outlive Their Copyrights, 11 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 437, 438–39 (1994).  
78 See NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12.  
79 Kurtz, supra note 21, at 440–41. 
80 Hill v. Whalen & Martell Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). 
81 Id. at 359–60.  
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding 
copyright infringement could exist where only the visual images of Batman, Green Arrow and the 
Batman insignia were appropriated); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753, 755 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (protecting visual images of Disney characters in the absence of any characterization or plot 
elements).  
84 Kurtz, supra note 77, at 437.  
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copyright infringement.85  However, the Nichols court declined to decide 
the issue, instead noting that the issue was not properly before the court.86  
Over thirty years later, in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the issue 
was properly before the court when Air Pirates admitted to directly 
copying the images of Disney’s characters without copying any 
characterization or plot from the original Disney works.87  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the copying of graphic images alone was sufficient to 
establish copyright infringement.  Specifically, the court noted, “it is plain 
that copying a comic book character’s graphic image constitutes copying to 
an extent sufficient to justify a finding of infringement.” 88  Thus, copyright 
infringement may be established where the visual image alone is 
appropriated.89   
When the visual depiction of a character is not directly copied, courts 
are forced to engage in a more nuanced substantial similarity analysis, 
comparing the characters at issue “as they appear in their totality.”90  The 
potential complexity of this analysis is well illustrated in United Artists v. 
Ford Motor Co., where the court was forced to compare numerous aspects 
of animated feline characters.91  United alleged that Ford’s use of an 
animated feline character in its television ad campaign infringed United’s 
copyrights in the motion pictures, The Pink Panther and The Return of the 
Pink Panther.92  Recognizing that the visual images of the animated 
characters were not identical, the court announced that it was “not limited” 
to analyzing physical characteristics.93  Instead, in addition to their 
physical characteristics, the court compared the characters’ actions, 
movements, colors, and the music that accompanied the characters, finding 
that Ford’s character was not infringing.94   
                                                                                                                          
85 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nor need we hold that 
the same may not be true as to the characters, quite independently of the ‘plot’ proper, though as far as 
we know such as case has never arisen.”).  
86 Id.    
87 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1978). 
88 Id. at 756.  
89 Infringement has been found where the visual images of characters, wholly separate from any 
plot elements or characterizations, were reproduced in three-dimensional dolls of Raggedy Ann and 
Andy, Betty Boop, Sparky, and the Peanut characters.  Gruelle v. Molly-‘Es Doll Outfitters, Inc., 94 
F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1937) (Raggedy Ann and Andy); Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 
73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934) (Betty Boop); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538 
(2d Cir. 1924) (Sparky); United Feature Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D. 
Fla. 1983) (the Peanuts characters); see also Kurtz, supra note 21, at 450. (“[I]f the original aspects of 
visual expression are closely copied that should be sufficient for a finding of infringement, even if the 
two characters behave very differently.”). 
90 United Artists Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F. Supp. 89, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
91 Id.; see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1167 (9th Cir. 1977); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
1940). 
92 United Artists Corp., 483 F. Supp. at 95.    
93 Id. at 95. 
94 Id. at 93–95. 
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This same approach was adopted in Warner Brothers Inc. v. American 
Broadcasting Co.95  Warner Brothers owned the copyrights in various 
works embodying the Superman character.96  Warner Brothers alleged that 
Ralph Hinkley, the main character in ABC’s television series, The Greatest 
American Hero, was substantially similar to the protectable expression of 
Superman.97  The court examined “the total perception of the Hinkley 
character” in finding that Hinkley was not substantially similar to 
Superman and therefore not infringing.98  In so holding, American 
Broadcasting reaffirmed that courts may consider “not only the visual 
resemblance but also the totality of the characters’ attributes and traits.”99  
These cases thus provide strong support for the proposition that copying of 
a character, short of exact duplication and without copying elements of the 
plot proper, may still result in a finding of copyright infringement, as 
courts are not limited to analyzing any single aspect of the characters at 
issue. 
D.  Derivative Works Doctrine  
When the copyright term expires, a fictional character enters into the 
public domain and copyright law no longer restricts the public’s use of the 
character.100  However, when a fictional character is used in subsequent 
works that remain protected by copyright law, the extent to which a 
character is available to the domain is often unclear.  In accordance with 
the derivative works doctrine, courts have routinely held that the public 
may use the character as it appeared in works that are no longer subject to 
copyright protection. 101  The public may not, however, use the character 
traits that are developed in subsequent works and remain subject to 
copyright protection.102  This same concept applies to fictional characters 
when they appear in different media.103  
The standard for analyzing fictional characters in derivative works was 
developed in litigation over the Amos ‘n’ Andy characters.104  In Silverman 
                                                                                                                          
95 Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1983).  
96 Id. at 235.  
97 Id. at 236, 240.  
98 Id. at 243.  
Superman looks and acts like a brave, proud hero, who has dedicated his life to 
combating the forces of evil.  Hinkley looks and acts like a timid, reluctant hero who 
accepts his mission grudgingly and prefers to get on with his normal life . . . . In the 
genre of superheros [sic], Hinkley follows Superman as, in the genre of detectives, 
Inspector Clouseau follows Sherlock Holmes. 
Id.   
99 Id. at 241.  
100 NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12 n.20.1. 
101 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
102 NIMMER, supra note 13, at § 2.12 n.20.1. 
103 Id.  
104 Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1989).  
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v. CBS Inc., a playwright sought a declaratory judgment stating that the 
Amos ‘n’ Andy radio programs were in the public domain and thus the 
Amos ‘n’ Andy characters could be freely used in his plays.105 The question 
arose when the holder of the copyrights  to the pre-1948 radio programs 
and scripts failed to renew the copyright registrations, placing those 
programs and scripts into the public domain.106  At the same time, CBS had 
properly maintained its copyright in the post-1948 Amos ‘n’ Andy 
television programs and scripts, preserving copyright protection for all of 
the televised works.107  The Second Circuit held that “copyrights in 
derivative works secure protection only for the incremental additions of 
originality contributed by the authors of the derivative works.”108  As a 
result, the CBS copyrights would “provide protection only for the 
increments of expression beyond what is contained in the pre-1948 radio 
scripts.”109 
A similar analysis was undertaken more recently in Harvey Cartoons 
Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries.110  In this case, the original comic 
books containing the character Fatso, a member of Casper’s Ghostly Trio, 
fell into the public domain, while more recent derivative works remained 
subject to copyright protection.111  The court found that “a derivative 
copyright is good copyright only with regard to the original 
embellishments and additions it has made in the underlying work.”112  
Finding that Fatso had not changed “to any appreciable degree” in 
derivative works, the court concluded that the Fatso character was entirely 
a part of the public domain.113  In other situations, courts have found some 
degree of derivative copyright protection for characters such as Conan and 
He-Man.114  Yet even where protection is found, the analysis remains 
tightly focused on limiting protection to incremental additions of 
originality found in those derivative works still subject to copyright 
                                                                                                                          
105 Id. at 42–43. 
106 Id. at 42.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
109 Id. at 50 (emphasis added) (“It is, of course, likely that the visual portrayal of the characters 
added something beyond the delineation contained in the public domain radio scripts, but surely not 
every visual aspect is protected.”).  The court went on to note that Silverman was free to use the race of 
the characters in his musical since that was described in the original script, as well as “any other 
physical features adequately described in the pre-1948 radio scripts . . . even though those 
characteristics are visually apparent in the television films or tapes.”  Id. at 50.  
110 Harvey Cartoons Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
111 Id. at 1569.  
112 Id. at 1570. 
113 Id.  
114 Conan Props., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring a 
derivative work to “contain ‘non-trivial’ original aspects distinct from . . . the underlying work in the 
public domain”).   
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protection.115 
E.  The Necessity of a Two-Part Inquiry  
The level of copyright protection available to fictional characters has 
dramatically expanded as fictional characters have moved into new media 
and reached unprecedented levels of recognition and value.  From sequels 
to merchandizing, fictional characters are valuable assets with a 
remarkable ability to generate revenue.116  As a threshold issue, courts still 
evaluate the copyrightability of the allegedly infringed fictional character 
before engaging in a substantial similarity analysis.117  Perhaps because 
fictional characters are not expressly included as statutory subject matter, 
perhaps because courts are fearful of protecting ideas along with 
expression, or perhaps because courts find “[t]he description of a character 
in prose leaves much to the imagination,” an independent determination 
that a character is the proper subject of copyright protection remains a 
prerequisite to a finding of copyright infringement.118  Whether the 
analysis occurs under the standards outlined in Nichols, Warner Brothers, 
Air Pirates or some combination thereof, it remains an essential aspect of 
the copyright infringement analysis for fictional characters.   
Some scholars argue that the initial focus on copyrightability 
improperly shifts the court’s attention away from “comparing the 
characters in the allegedly infringed and infringing work, to analyzing 
whether a character is sufficiently distinctive or well-developed to deserve 
protection.”119  These scholars contend that “[m]uch of the confusion and 
lack of clarity in the standards used to protect fictional characters under 
copyright can be avoided by recognizing that the ‘copyrightability’ of a 
fictional character, whether literary, pictorial or audiovisual, is not the 
issue.”120  Instead, the issue is substantial similarity.121  Yet, these same 
scholars acknowledge that “the degree of similarity which will be 
considered substantial is one of the most uncertain questions in copyright 
and ‘one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations’.”122  
Thus, the initial focus on copyrightability is an appropriate and necessary 
mechanism for respecting  the idea/expression dichotomy, a task that 
                                                                                                                          
115 Id. at 359 (“Yet even a derivative work must be ‘original’ to warrant copyright protection, and 
although originality ‘need not be inventions in the sense of striking uniqueness, ingenious our novelty,’ 
. . . a derivative work must ‘contain some substantial, not merely trivial originality’.”). 
116 See Walker, supra note 6, at 1D.  
117 See e.g., Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In order to establish 
copyright infringement a plaintiff must prove ownership of the copyright and copying by the 
defendant.”).  
118 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). 
119 Kurtz, supra note 77, at 440.  
120 Id. at 472. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
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cannot be accomplished by the substantial similarity analysis alone.  
If courts were permitted to begin the infringement analysis with the 
“most uncertain question[] in copyright law,” substantial similarity, the 
risk of over-protecting fictional characters would be significant, 
particularly with respect to literary characters.123  Consider, for example, a 
minor character in a mystery novel.  This character is the intelligent, shy 
sidekick of the novel’s hero, a charming detective.  The author of this 
mystery novel brings an infringement action against a television studio 
running a new mystery series featuring a charming detective with a shy 
sidekick.  One court begins the infringement analysis by first analyzing 
whether the sidekick character is an appropriate subject of copyright 
protection.  This court dismisses the case, finding the sidekick to be 
nothing more than a stock character, commonplace in detective stories, and 
inadequately defined to warrant copyright protection.  A second court 
begins the infringement analysis by examining the substantial similarity of 
the characters.  This court undertakes a rigorous comparison, examining 
numerous attributes of each character, finding that both characters wore 
glasses, tended to uncover important clues, had a shy disposition, and were 
approximately the same age.  Distracted by the similarity of these low 
levels of abstraction, the second court finds the similarity to be substantial 
and the television series therefore infringing.  In the end, the second court 
has incorrectly provided copyright protection to a stock character, present 
in nearly every mystery novel or television show because the larger 
question, the copyrightability of the original character, was not adequately 
addressed.  Thus, the uncertainty of the substantial similarity analysis 
combined with the complexity of protecting fictional characters, require 
that courts first determine if a character is a proper subject for copyright 
protection.  If such an analysis is not conducted, the extension of copyright 
protection to ill-defined characters representing little more than vague 
ideas and generalities will be commonplace.124 
In sum, evaluating whether a fictional character is a proper subject for 
copyright protection is an unavoidable threshold issue in the copyright 
infringement analysis.  While the standard has at times been too restrictive, 
the most restrictive line of cases has essentially been overruled.125  
Currently, where characters are visually depicted, courts routinely and 
                                                                                                                          
123 Id.  
124 In many respects, the threshold analysis of copyrightability is reminiscent of other intellectual 
property regimes.  In patent law for example, an invention may meet the standards of novelty, 
usefulness and nonobviousness, yet where it does not meet the threshold requirement of embodying 
statutory subject matter, it is not patentable.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2000).  In trademark law, a 
finding of non-functionality is a prerequisite to trademark protection.  If a trade dress fails to meet the 
non-functionality requirement, trademark protection is unavailable.  Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001).  
125 See supra Part II.B.  
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appropriately find that they are per se entitled to copyright protection.126  
In cases where characters are purely literary in nature, the analysis is 
inherently more complex, as the abstractions created in the minds of 
readers are more challenging to quantify than concrete visual images.127  
The subject will therefore continue to be a challenging one, as courts must 
define intangible, literary characters for the purposes of legal analysis.  
Nonetheless, the existence of complexity does not support an argument 
that the inquiry should be eliminated altogether, particularly where the 
substantial similarity analysis alone fails to ensure that copyright 
protection is extended only to original expression.           
III.  TRADEMARK PROTECTION 
Trademark and unfair competition laws provide fictional characters 
with a second form of intellectual property protection that is dramatically 
different from the protection available under copyright law.  Copyright law 
seeks to protect the original writings of an author and is mainly concerned 
with a character’s development and individualization as a threshold for 
protection.128  Trademark and unfair competition laws seek to protect the 
commercial value of trademarks, and are mainly concerned with the ability 
of a mark to symbolize the source of goods or services as a threshold for 
protection.129  Trademarks “are designed to guard consumers against 
confusion as to the source or authorization of an item connected to a 
trademark.”130  Such protection provides consistency, allowing consumers 
to rely on the information conveyed by the mark, thereby significantly 
reducing consumer search costs and encouraging manufactures to invest in 
the creation of quality products and consumer goodwill.131  A trademark 
owner is thus provided with a limited monopoly over the use of the mark in 
connection with those goods and services for which the mark has the 
ability to serve as an indication of source.132  Trademark protection exists 
so long as a mark retains its source-identifying capacity, and may therefore 
persist in perpetuity.133 
Trademark and unfair competition laws offer intellectual property 
protection to fictional characters at both the state and federal level.  The 
Lanham Act provides the basis for federal trademark protection and 
                                                                                                                          
126 See supra notes 70–94 and accompanying text.   
127 See supra Part II.A, B.   
128 Kurtz, supra note 21, at 444–53 (quoting Judge Hand: “the less developed the characters, the 
less they can be copyrighted”).  
129 15 U.S.C § 1125 (2006). 
130 Christine Nickels, The Conflicts Between Intellectual Property Protections When a Character 
Enters the Public Domain, UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133, 155 (1999). 
131 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. 
& ECON. 265, 269 (1987).  
132 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
133 Id. § 1058 (2006).   
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defines a trademark as, “any word, name, symbol or device or any 
combination thereof used . . . to identify and distinguish . . . goods . . . from 
those [of] others and to indicate the source of the goods . . . .”134  
Numerous state unfair competition laws also provide protection to fictional 
characters,135 and the critical legal issue at both the state and federal level 
is whether the contested use of a mark is likely to cause confusion as to the 
“origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods, services, or commercial 
activities . . . . ”136  In the absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion, 
trademark infringement will not be found.137  However, in 1995, the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act removed the requirement of likelihood of 
confusion for a subset of marks found to be “famous.”138  This legislation 
substantially increased the protection available to famous marks and 
created an area of trademark law where the protection of fictional 
characters may well be overextended. 
A.  Acquiring Distinctiveness 
In order to qualify as a trademark under the Lanham Act, a mark must 
be able to identify and distinguish goods or services from those goods or 
services provided by others.139  To satisfy this requirement, a mark must be 
“distinctive.”140  Distinctiveness can be either inherent or acquired through 
prior use of the mark establishing secondary meaning.141  Secondary 
meaning is established when an otherwise indistinctive mark has “become 
distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce” through the applicant’s 
use of the mark, creating public recognition that the particular mark is 
associated with the applicant.142   
Recently, courts have begun to impose more stringent distinctiveness 
requirements for certain classes of trademarks.  In 2000, the Supreme 
Court held that where consumers are not “predisposed to regard 
[particular] symbols as [an] indication of the producer . . . inherent 
                                                                                                                          
134 Id. § 1127.  Federal trademark protection is available for both registered and unregistered 
marks; however there are greater remedies available for registered marks.  See Id. § 1114 (2006) 
(outlining remedies that are limited to registered trademarks).  
135 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.7 
(1992).  
136 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1995), amended by Id. § 1125(c) (2006).   
137 Id. § 1125 (2006).  
138 Id. § 1125(e).  
139 Id. § 1127. 
140 Id. § 1052.  
141 Id. § 1052(f).   
142 Id.; see, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“The concept of secondary meaning recognizes that words with an ordinary and primary 
meaning of their own ‘may be long use with a particular product, come to be known by the public as 
specifically designating that product’.”).  A finding of secondary meaning in the New Orleans area for 
Zatarains’ descriptive term ‘Fish-Fri’ was upheld after extensive consumer surveys were conducted.  
Id. at 795–96.   
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distinctiveness will not be found.”143  Both color marks144 and product 
design145 have been found to lack this predisposition, thus requiring a 
showing of secondary meaning to obtain trademark protection.  Achieving 
distinctiveness through secondary meaning, unlike inherent distinctiveness, 
requires actual use of the mark for a period of time sufficient to create 
public recognition.  Therefore, establishing acquired distinctiveness both 
delays the implementation of trademark protection and places a heavy 
evidentiary burden on the party seeking to gain trademark rights.  
In the realm of fictional characters there has yet to be a case where the 
court expressly denied the possibility of inherent distinctiveness.  
However, not a single court has found a fictional character to be inherently 
distinctive.146  Instead, courts have routinely required a showing of 
secondary meaning, limiting trademark protection to those fictional 
characters that have undergone a reasonable degree of circulation and 
established some level of public recognition.  In Fisher v. Star Co., the 
New York Court of Appeals found that the Mutt and Jeff cartoon 
characters had been “published and became well known as distinct 
characters.”147  In reasoning that the characters were entitled to protection, 
the court noted that “[t]he figures and names have been so connected with 
the respondent as their originator or author that the use by another of new 
cartoons exploiting the characters ‘Mutt and Jeff’ would be unfair to the 
public and to the plaintiff.”148  While the court ultimately decided the case 
on state unfair competition grounds, Fisher established the framework for 
analyzing the acquired distinctiveness of fictional characters. 
In more recent cases, courts have continued to evaluate the 
distinctiveness of fictional characters under a standard similar to that 
discussed in Fisher.149  In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the 
publisher of the Peter Rabbit book series sought trademark protection for 
eight character illustrations.150  While the court accepted that the 
illustrations were “capable of distinguishing Warne’s books from those of 
others,” it rejected the possibility that the illustrations could be inherently 
distinctive.151  Remanding the case, the court placed the burden on the 
                                                                                                                          
143 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2000). 
144 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 163, 166 (1995) (holding that color marks do 
not constitute inherently distinctive marks). 
145 See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 216 (holding that product design is not inherently 
distinctive). 
146 Nickles, supra note 130, at 160.  
147 Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 431 (1921). 
148 Id. at 432.  
149 Id.  (requiring that fictional characters are well-known as distinct characters to achieve 
acquired distinctiveness).  
150 Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
151 Id. at 1195 (“[I]t cannot be said that they are so arbitrary, unique and non-descriptive as to 
constitute ‘technical trademarks’ which are presumed valid as soon as they are affixed to the goods and 
the goods are sold.”). 
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publisher to establish that these illustrations had acquired distinctiveness in 
the eyes of the consuming public.152  In M’Otto Enterprises v. Redsand 
Inc., M’Otto sought a declaratory judgment that its caricature of a 
volleyball player did not infringe Redsand’s caricature.153  Redsand’s mark 
was a registered trademark, creating a strong presumption of validity, yet 
the court reasoned that even in the absence of registration, the caricature 
would be “distinctive based upon[] widespread use and recognition.”154   
By consistently requiring a showing of acquired distinctiveness, courts 
have effectively eliminated the argument that a fictional character can ever 
be inherently distinctive.  As a result, the proponent of a trademark must 
satisfy the heavy evidentiary burden of acquired distinctiveness through 
widespread use and recognition.  Even so, it should be noted that this 
burden serves as an important mechanism for evaluating the 
appropriateness of trademark protection, forcing courts to examine the 
ability of a fictional character to serve actually as an indicator of source 
rather than permitting a conclusory finding of inherent distinctiveness.  
Thus, the acquired distinctiveness analysis helps to ensure that trademark 
protection does not restrict the creative use of fictional characters beyond 
the extent necessary to protect a character’s source identifying capacity.   
B.  Single Source Identification  
When a fictional character acquires distinctiveness, that character is 
able to fulfill the statutory requirement of identifying and distinguishing 
goods.155  However, another important statutory requirement often 
prohibits even a distinctive character from receiving trademark protection.  
The Lanham Act specifically states that a trademark must “indicate the 
source of the goods.”156  Courts have interpreted this language to require 
that a trademark indicate only a single source of the goods.157  This 
presents particular difficulty for fictional characters, as they are often 
simultaneously associated with a number of different sources, including 
authors,158 producers,159 sponsors160 and even themselves.161  As a result, a 
                                                                                                                          
152 Id. at 1196, 1199. 
153 M’Otto Enters., Inc. v. Redsand Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1491, 1492–93 (W.D. Wash. 1993).  
154 Id. at 1499. 
155 See supra notes 139–54 and accompanying text.   
156 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added). 
157 Universal Studios v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911, 923–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also 
Michael T. Helfand, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual 
Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 635–38 
(1999) (noting that trademarks operate “to signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from a 
single, albeit anonymous, source”); Nickles supra note 130, at 163–64 (noting that courts have 
interpreted the statutory requirement that the trademark indicate the source of goods as necessitating a 
single source).   
158 Gruelle v. Molly-‘Es Doll Outfitters Inc., 94 F.2d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 1937) (finding that the 
Raggedy Ann doll was associated with the author, John B. Gruelle); Patten v. Superior Talking 
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“fictional character’s ability to indicate a single source is often no more 
than a convenient fiction.”162  Indeed, if a fictional character is unable to 
identify a single source, the character is unable to serve the goals of 
trademark law.  
The concern that fictional characters do not identify a single source is 
well illustrated in the case of Frederick Warne Co. v. Book Sales Inc.163  In 
this case, the publisher of the original Peter Rabbit book series, Warne, 
sought protection for illustrations that were created exclusively for 
Warne’s editions of the Peter Rabbit books.164  Warne claimed that the 
characters portrayed in the illustrations had “attained a place in the public 
esteem comparable to Mickey Mouse, Peter Pan and Raggedy Ann and 
Andy.”165  Regardless of the level of esteem the illustrations had achieved, 
the court was quick to point out that a particular type of esteem was 
required, noting that “it would not be enough that the illustrations in 
question have come to signify Beatrix Potter as [the] author of the books; 
plaintiff must show that they have come to represent [Warne’s] goodwill 
and reputation as [the] publisher of those books.”166  The court went on to 
find that if the publisher could “establish a specialized secondary 
meaning—that the illustrations represent Warne’s goodwill and reputation 
as the source . . . it will have a protectable trademark interest . . . .”167  This 
focus on single source identification lead the court to the appropriate 
conclusion that trademark protection was not warranted in the absence of 
evidence demonstrating the public’s identification of the illustrations with 
the publisher. 
The single source requirement is particularly relevant where a 
character appears in a variety of different media.  In Universal City Studios 
Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Universal sued the holder of the Donkey Kong 
copyright for alleged infringement of the King Kong trademark.168  In 
reviewing the complicated facts surrounding ownership of the mark, the 
court held that the King Kong trademark lacked the ability to identify a 
                                                                                                                          
Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that Frank Merriwell’s character was 
associated with the author, Burt L. Standish). 
159 Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding 
an association with the producers and the television show); Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman Inc., 157 F. 
Supp. 621, 624–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (finding an association with the producer and the television series). 
160 Premier Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760–61 (D. Conn. 1935) 
(holding that the Old Maestro character is associated in the public mind with Pabst Blue Ribbon, the 
sponsor of the Old Maestro radio program). 
161 DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus. Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 112, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1984) 
(finding Clark Kent to be associated with Superman). 
162 Kurtz, supra note 21, at 485.  
163 Frederic Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
164 Id. at 1193.  
165 Id. at 1194.  
166 Id. at 1195.  
167 Id. at 1198. 
168 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 911, 913–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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single source.169  The existence of various competing property interests in 
the mark, including RKO (owner of the original 1933 movie and its 
sequel), Cooper (owner of the worldwide book and periodical publishing 
rights to King Kong), DDL (owner of the 1976 remake) and the 
unauthorized third-party use of King Kong trademarks, made it impossible 
for the mark to serve as a single source identifier.170  Universal attempted 
to overcome these murky ownership issues by arguing that trademark law 
does not require consumers to know exactly which party is the source of a 
trademarked product.171  The court acknowledged that this argument was 
correct, but emphasized that even so, it did not obviate the “statutory 
[requirement] . . . that the mark indicate to consumers a single source of 
origin.”172  While the consumer may not have knowledge of the particular 
source of the good, the consumer must understand that the good originates 
from a single source.   
Courts frequently fail to apply the single source requirement in a 
rigorous manner.  In many instances, courts ignore the issue altogether 
despite the propensity of fictional characters to identify a plurality of 
sources.173  Overall, single source identification operates in much the same 
way as distinctiveness.  Both are required for a character to fulfill its 
function as a trademark, and in the absence of either, the protection of 
fictional characters under trademark law is inappropriate.   
C.  Protected Elements   
Once a fictional character is deemed appropriate for trademark 
protection, courts must determine which elements of these often complex 
creations are to be protected.  Trademark protection has been extended to a 
wide range of elements including character names,174 nicknames,175 
costumes,176 and even key phrases associated with a character.177  
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 923–24. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 925; see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, 
symbol or device, or any combination thereof . . . [used] to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”).  
172 Universal City Studios, 578 F. Supp. at 925.   
173 Kurtz, supra note 77, at 443–44. 
174 See Premier Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935) 
(finding trademark protection for the Old Maestro character).  
175 See Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 1976) 
(finding trademark protection for the nickname Tarz based on public recognition of the name Tarzan 
and the likelihood that the use of the nickname Tarz would cause confusion or mistake about the source 
of origin of the defendant’s film). 
176 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 
1979) (finding “the combination of the white boots, white shorts, blue blouse, and white star-studded 
vest and belt” to be a trademarkable costume). 
177 See Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1942) (protecting the phrase “Hi-yo, 
Silver, away!”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162, 1164–65 (S.D. Texas 
1982) (protecting the phrase “E.T. Phone Home!!”).  
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Nevertheless, courts were historically reluctant to extend trademark 
protection to the visual appearance of characters, interpreting such 
protection as the province of copyright.  In Gruelle v. Molly-’Es Doll 
Outfitters Inc., the court protected the name Raggedy Ann as a trademark, 
yet refused to recognize a trademark in the doll itself.  Instead, the court 
considered copyright to be the proper avenue for such a claim, declining to 
enjoin the use of the deceptively similar doll in the absence of a copyright 
claim.178  For a period of time following Gruelle, courts continued to 
analyze copyright and trademark claims separately, generally limiting 
protection of three-dimensional representations to copyright.179 
The restrained approach of analyzing copyright and trademark claims 
separately soon gave way to a less coherent line of cases that often 
commingled trademark and copyright principles.  In Walt Disney 
Productions v. Air Pirates, the defendants used the world’s most famous 
rodent, Mickey Mouse, in counter-culture comic books of questionable 
taste.180  In an effort to overcome the stringent copyright “story being told” 
test, the district court emphasized “that the depiction of each character as it 
has been developed by the plaintiff has achieved a high degree of 
‘recognition’ or ‘identification’.”181  Through the use of these trademark 
principles, the district court created copyright protection for Mickey 
Mouse.182  While eventually overruled by the Ninth Circuit on other 
grounds, the district court’s opinion is indicative of the convoluted 
reasoning once employed to protect three-dimensional representations of 
characters.   
Following a similar line of reasoning as the district court in Air 
Pirates, the court in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. 
McDonald’s Corp. relied on trademark principals to sustain a finding of 
copyright infringement.183  Comparing the similarity of the characters at 
issue, the court found that the defendant had captured the “total concept 
and feel” of the works, sufficient to support a finding of copyright 
                                                                                                                          
178 Gruelle v. Molly-’Es Doll Outfitters Inc., 94 F.2d 172, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1937). 
179 See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prod. Div., 443 F. Supp. 291, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[I]nsofar 
as the defendants claim that visual similarities between Ideal’s toys and the movie characters create a 
misimpression of ‘sponsorship’ by or derivation from ‘Star Wars,’ the Court has already discussed at 
some length the similarities between the toys themselves and the movie characters in connection with 
the allegation of copyright infringement.”); Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 336, 350 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding the sale of the cartoons included the copyright and therefore the right to 
three-dimensional representations of the figures). 
180 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).  
181 Walt Disney Prods., 345 F. Supp. at 113.  
182 Id.  
183 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
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infringement.184  Moving away from the generally accepted copyright 
analysis of substantial similarity, the traditional trademark “look and feel” 
test was clearly an improper basis for a finding of copyright 
infringement.185  The following year, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Air 
Pirates removed the “story being told” restriction for copyright protection 
of visually depicted characters and eliminated the need to combine 
copyright and trademark principles to sustain protection for three-
dimensional representations of fictional characters.186  
Today, courts generally encounter little difficulty providing trademark 
protection to three-dimensional representations of fictional characters 
under traditional trademark doctrines.  In Warner Brothers v. American 
Broadcasting Co., the Second Circuit declared that they “did not doubt that 
the image of a cartoon character and some indicia of that character can 
function as a trademark to identify the source of a work of 
entertainment.”187  In the wake of this opinion, the visual appearances of 
fictional characters have been routinely protected, including the visual 
appearances of the characters of the Peanuts comic strip,188 Superman and 
Wonder Woman,189 and even E.T.190  Thus, courts have come to recognize 
the unique ability of fictional characters to serve a source identifying 
function.191 
D.  Likelihood of Confusion  
Once an element of a fictional character is recognized as a trademark, 
the owner of the trademark must demonstrate that the allegedly infringing 
mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or is likely to deceive the 
public as to the source or sponsorship of the goods or services.192  In the 
                                                                                                                          
184 Id. at 1167, 1169, 1175. (“[T]he combination of many different elements . . . command 
copyright protection because of its particular subjective quality.”). 
185 Riger K. Zissu, Copyright Luncheon Circle: The Interplay of Copyright and Trademark Law in 
the Protection of Character Rights With Observations on Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 453, 455 (2004). 
186 Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 755. 
187 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983).  Nevertheless, 
the court held that, as a matter of law, the contested works lacked the substantial similarity necessarily 
to create a likelihood of confusion.  Id.  The Warner Brothers court relied on the earlier opinion of DC 
Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates which held that not only the name, but the product itself, in this 
case Aquaman, could be trademarked.  DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[O]ur reading of the cases in this circuit shows that where the product sold by 
plaintiff is ‘entertainment’ in one form or another, then not only the advertising of the product but also 
an ingredient of the product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under § 43(a) because the 
ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its product in the public mind.”). 
188 United Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1983). 
189 DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (N.D. Ga. 1984).  
190 Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 679, 683–84 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
191 For example, in 1988, the licensing of the characters in the movie Teenage Mutant Ninja 
Turtles netted over $175 million dollars.  In 1989, licensing fees reached $350 million dollars. That 
same year, Batman generated over $251 in licensing fees.  Nickles, supra note 130, at 134.  
192 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006).  
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absence of a likelihood of consumer confusion, a finding of trademark 
infringement is an unwarranted limitation on creativity and expression, for 
the trademark owner’s rights have not been infringed.  The likelihood of 
confusion analysis therefore provides courts with another important 
mechanism for limiting the scope of trademark protection. 
The unauthorized use of characters in new works of fiction often 
places the interests of trademark protection and creative expression in 
direct competition with one another.  Where a character is well known, 
courts typically enjoin others from using the character in new works of 
fiction.193  Trademark protection is extended to such well-known 
characterson the assumption that consumers are likely to believe that the 
creators of the first work created, or at the very least, authorized the second 
work.194  The fictional character Lone Ranger provides an example of such 
a well-known character.  In Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, the unlicensed use of 
the Lone Ranger character in a circus was enjoined,195 and in Lone Ranger, 
Inc. v. Curry, the unlicensed use of the Lone Ranger character in rodeo 
shows was enjoined.196  In both cases, the courts held that the defendants 
were attempting to pass off their show as having an affiliation with Lone 
Ranger Inc., resulting in a likelihood that consumers would be confused as 
to the source or sponsorship of the shows.197  
In DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business the well-known 
characters of Superman and Wonder Woman were also protected from 
unauthorized use in new works, namely the singing telegram business.198  
The court found that the Superman and Wonder Woman characters 
constituted distinctive marks by virtue of their “universal recognition,” 
“widespread popularity,” and “extensive goodwill.”199  Based on the 
marks’ acquired distinctiveness and the similarity of the defendant’s 
singing telegram mark, the court found a likelihood of confusion and 
granted relief. Evidence of actual consumer confusion served only to 
strengthen the decision to enjoin the defendant’s use of the marks.200  
In cases where characters are less well known, courts are hesitant to 
restrict their use in new works of fiction.  This point is well illustrated by 
the character of Paladin in De Costa v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems.201  
Victor DeCosta created a colorful character named Paladin and proceeded 
to perform as Paladin at rodeos, horse shows, auctions and parades, 
                                                                                                                          
193 See, e.g., Prouty v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 265–66 (D. Mass. 1939) (enjoining the 
use of the character Stella Dallas in skits created by NBC on a theory of unfair competition). 
194 Kurtz supra note 21, at 489. 
195 Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 651–52, 654 (4th Cir. 1942). 
196 Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190, 191–95 (M.D. Pa. 1948). 
197 Cox, 124 F.2d at 652; Currey, 79 F. Supp. at 195. 
198 DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115–16 (D.C. Ga. 1984). 
199 Id. at 115. 
200 Id. at 116. 
201 De Costa v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 F.2d 499, 502 (1st Cir. 1975). 
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circulating business cards with the logo “Have Gun Will Travel.”202  
Nearly a decade after DeCosta began appearing as Paladin, a television 
series entitled Have Gun Will Travel, starring a character by the name of 
Paladin, dressed in a costume nearly identical to that of DeCosta’s Paladin, 
began running on CBS.203  DeCosta sued CBS under theories of trademark 
infringement and unfair competition.  Denying relief, the court emphasized 
that DeCosta’s limited use of the character and the difference in the 
respective audiences resulted in little likelihood of confusion as to the 
source or sponsorship of the CBS television series.204  This same fate is 
often suffered by trademark holders where the alleged infringer’s use of a 
character involves less than a complete replica of the original character.205  
Courts also decline to extend protection in many cases where the alleged 
infringement involves less tangible qualities, such as physical 
characteristics and personality.206  
The use of fictional characters on commercial products has become a 
widespread, lucrative practice.  However, the construction of a likelihood 
of confusion analysis for commercial products has proven to be more 
problematic than the construction of the same analysis for new works of 
fiction.  The difficulty arises out of a fundamental disagreement regarding 
the ability of a fictional character on commercial products to indicate to 
consumers the source, or at least the sponsorship, of a given product.  This 
question is of critical importance because in the absence of such an 
association, the character does not serve as a source identifier and there can 
be no likelihood of confusion.  Thus, much of the litigation surrounding 
commercial products has turned on this critical issue.207  
In some instances, courts have denied protection where the defendant’s 
merchandise failed to create a specific association with the plaintiff, 
regardless of the fact that the defendant’s merchandise was more generally 
associated with the fictional character at issue.  In Toho Co. v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., the producer of the Godzilla movies sought to enjoin Sears 
from producing garbage bags under the name “Bagzilla,” displaying a 
humorous caricature of a monster with a striking resemblance to 
Godzilla.208  The court determined that consumers were likely to associate 
                                                                                                                          
202 Id. at 502. 
203 Id.   
204 Id. at 514. 
205 See Universal City Studios Inc. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 746 F.2d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(finding use of the Donkey Kong character was not likely to cause confusion with King Kong and 
Universal Studios).  
206 See Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to extend 
protection to a comedy writer who asserted that his name had acquired secondary meaning as the 
originator of a prison rodeo movie concept). 
207 See e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that a garbage bag seller’s use of “Bagzilla” with the slogan “monstrously strong bags” posed no 
likelihood of confusing customers as to the source of the bags).  
208 Id. at 789–90.  
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Bagzilla with Godzilla.  Nonetheless, this finding was insufficient to 
establish trademark infringement as the Bagzilla product posed “no 
likelihood of confusing consumers by suggesting that the Sears trash bags 
were made, sponsored or endorsed by [the plaintiff].”209  Therefore, under 
Toho, the general association of an infringing product with a fictional 
character will not result in a finding of trademark infringement in the 
absence of a similar association with the trademark owner.210  
Other courts have found trademark infringement where the infringing 
mark creates an association between the defendant’s products and the 
plaintiff’s character yet does not create an association with the particular 
plaintiff.  In these instances, the likelihood of confusion analysis did not 
focus on the ability of the fictional character to invoke a direct association 
with the plaintiff.  Instead, the courts focused on the defendant’s 
exploitation of the general demand for a character created by the 
plaintiff.211  In Wyatt Earp Enterprises v. Sackman, Inc., the creators of the 
television series Wyatt Earp were granted a preliminary injunction against 
a manufacturer of children’s Wyatt Earp costumes.212  The court found a 
likelihood that the public would purchase the merchandise “because of an 
identification with the name Wyatt Earp as developed by the plaintiff’s 
television program.”213  The court went on to assume, without discussion, 
that the character Wyatt Earp would in turn be associated with the 
plaintiff.214  
In more recent cases, courts have acknowledged that the exploitation 
of well-known fictional characters through merchandising agreements has 
become almost universal, creating a public expectation that merchandise 
displaying elements of a fictional character is at least sponsored by the 
owner of the character.215  Some scholars argue that this is a “bootstrap 
result,” based on court enforcement of licensing agreements, such that 
public perceptions could and should change.216  While this may be a valid 
interpretation of the cause of the public perception, it should not change 
the outcome of a court’s decision to provide trademark protection.  The 
cause of a particular public perception is not relevant to the trademark 
analysis.  It matters not why the public associates the presence of a 
character on merchandise with sponsorship or licensing of the 
                                                                                                                          
209 Id. at 790.  
210 Id.  
211 Kurtz supra note 21, at 498. 
212 Wyatt Earp Enters. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 623, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).  
213 Id. at 625 (internal citations omitted).  
214 Id.  
215 See, e.g., Conan Props Inc. v. Conans Pizza Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Many of 
today’s consumers expect such endorsements and act favorably toward them.”); Warner Bros. Inc. v. 
Gay Toys Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The public’s belief that the mark’s owner sponsored or 
otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies the confusion requirement.”). 
216 Kurtz, supra note 77, at 445–46. 
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merchandise, but only that the public does in fact make this association.  
Courts have generally supported this concept, particularly where consumer 
surveys provided evidence of a general consumer perception that fictional 
characters are subject to licensing agreements.217  
Trademark protection of fictional characters provides many benefits to 
both the consuming public and the trademark owner.  Protection reduces 
consumer search costs and consumer confusion while at the same time 
providing incentives for trademark owners to maintain quality and promote 
goodwill.  However, when fictional characters fail to provide the public 
with the benefit of source identification, a finding of trademark 
infringement unnecessarily removes fictional characters from the public 
domain.  Fortunately, trademark and unfair competition laws provide many 
tools to limit protection to appropriate circumstances.  Through careful 
consideration of acquired distinctiveness, single source identification, and 
likelihood of consumer confusion, trademark protection can be confined to 
its appropriate scope.    
E.  Dilution  
Dilution provides fictional characters with another powerful form of 
trademark protection.218  The theory of dilution is generally traced back to 
Frank I. Schechter’s 1927 Harvard Law Review article where he described 
dilution as guarding against “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of 
the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use 
upon non-competing goods.”219  Prior to 1995, dilution jurisprudence was a 
combination of inconsistent and unsettled state law doctrines that were 
largely ignored by federal courts.220  Courts and scholars alike were 
concerned that dilution would override copyright law, as well as traditional 
trademark protection, by permanently removing certain characters from the 
public domain and creating trademark rights in gross.221  Irrespective of 
these well-grounded fears, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 
(FTDA) and the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006222 
                                                                                                                          
217 See Processed Plastics Co. v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854–55 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(involving a consumer survey that indicated confusion between toy cars and the Dukes of Hazzard 
television series where the toy cars were a direct replica of the television car); Warner Bros., Inc. v. 
Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving a consumer survey that revealed that eight out of 
ten children associated the defendant’s replica of the Dukes of Hazzard car with the actual Dukes of 
Hazzard car). 
218 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
219 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 
(1927).   
220 In 1995, twenty-eight states recognized a theory of dilution.  A showing of likelihood of 
confusion was required in some states while others required the absence of competition between 
parties.  Kristen Knudsen, Tomorrow Never Dies, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 13, 17 (2000).  
221 Helfand, supra note 157, at 639.   
222 The Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act (FTDRA) of 2006 made several important 
amendments to the original FTDA.  Most importantly, the FTDRA expressly overruled the Supreme 
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(FTDRA) have forced courts to recognize dilution as a cause of action on 
the federal level.223  
Dilution presents a form of trademark protection quite different from 
that available under more traditional trademark doctrines.  As a 
prerequisite to dilution protection, a mark must be found to be “famous.”224  
Once a court makes the difficult and often unpredictable determination that 
a mark is famous, dilution provides broad protection in the absence of a 
likelihood of consumer confusion, even protecting the use of marks on 
non-competing goods.225  While litigation regarding dilution of fictional 
characters at the federal level has been sparse, the cases that have been 
decided illustrate the potentially sweeping nature of dilution protection.  In 
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., Danjaq, the assignee of all U.S. film and 
television rights in the James Bond character, sought an injunction to halt 
Sony’s plan to make a series of James Bond movies.226  The court granted 
a broad injunction, prohibiting all use of the James Bond mark by Sony, 
finding a likelihood that Sony’s use of the mark in any capacity would 
result in dilution by blurring.227  In 1999, the fictional character Arthur, a 
cartoon aardvark, was granted similar broad protection in Brown v. It’s 
Entertainment Inc., where the court prohibited the use of unlicensed Arthur 
costumes for live entertainment and promotional appearances.228  The court 
was concerned that “[s]hould unauthorized Arthur impersonators 
proliferate . . . the image sought by the plaintiffs for Arthur will be difficult 
to control and might easily become blurred or tarnished, resulting in a loss 
                                                                                                                          
Court’s decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue.  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 
432–33 (2003), superseded by statute 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).  In Moseley, the Supreme Court 
had dismissed the case, requiring a showing of actual dilution to support a finding of dilution.  Id. at 
434.  The FTDRA changed the standard to merely a likelihood of dilution, thereby significantly 
decreasing the necessary evidentiary showing.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (“use of a mark or trade 
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution . . . regardless of the presence or absence of actual or 
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”).  The FTDRA also limited dilution 
claims to two categories, dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment, id. § 1125(c)(1) (prohibiting 
the “use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment”), removed the possibility niche fame, id. § 1125(c)(2)(A), and clarified the enumerated 
exclusions and fair use defenses, id. § 1125(c)(3).  
223 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
224 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“For the purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the mark’s owner.  In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree 
of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, 
extent and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized 
by the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume and geographic extent of sales of goods or 
services offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. (iv) Whether the 
mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the 
principal register.”). 
225 Id. § 1125(c)(1) (“regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition or of actual economic injury”).  
226 Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1341, 1343–44 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  
227 Id. at 1348.  
228 Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).  
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of credibility, public affection and consumer interest.”229  
While dilution is limited to famous marks, these cases are illustrative 
of the sweeping protection that may be granted once a mark is found to be 
famous.  Some commentators believe that federal trademark dilution 
“ensures that famous fictional characters will not be pressed into 
undignified service or cloned by copiers.”230  Other critics worry that the 
“widespread ban on unauthorized use, even if the public is not in danger of 
being mislead,” undermines the traditional goals of trademark 
protection.231  In the end, federal trademark dilution will likely prove to be 
an important mechanism for protecting the source identifying capacity of 
some of our culture’s most influential fictional characters.  Yet providing 
such protection creates a very real possibility that famous characters will 
be over-protected by broad injunctions that unnecessarily limit the public’s 
use of fictional characters.  
In order to confine dilution to an appropriate scope, particular attention 
must be paid to the exclusions of the FTDRA, which specifically outline 
those acts that “shall not be actionable as dilution.”232  Congress 
intentionally strengthened the exclusions in the FTDRA, in part to offset 
the lowered evidentiary showing necessary to sustain a dilution claim, 
mainly likelihood of dilution in place of actual dilution.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to respect the weight of these exclusions by carefully analyzing 
the nature of the contested use to ensure that the use is in fact actionable.  
Consider for example, a hypothetical use of the James Bond character in a 
Saturday Night Live skit featuring the aging Pierce Brosnan performing 
“James Bond-style” action hero stunts around a retirement community.  
While a court would likely find the James Bond character to be famous and 
its use in a television skit likely to cause dilution by blurring or even 
tarnishment, the fair use exclusion for parodying must be controlling.233   
Still in its infancy, the appropriateness of dilution with regard to 
fictional characters will turn on the courts’ ability to develop a consistent 
jurisprudence that calibrates the standard for determining when a mark is 
“famous” at an appropriate level of recognition and provides adequate 
                                                                                                                          
229 Id. at 859.  
230 Knudsen, supra note 220, at 19.  
231 Vincent N. Palladino, Reigning in Trademark Dilution Claims, 1 N.Y.L.J. 1, 8 (1999). 
232 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(3) (2006) (“The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or 
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive 
fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation 
of source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with—(i) advertising or 
promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and parodying, 
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark 
owner. (B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. (C) Any noncommercial use of a 
mark.”). 
233 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006) (“identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting 
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner”). 
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strength to the enumerated exclusions.234     
IV.  DUAL PROTECTION: COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK 
Analyzing the intellectual property protection available to fictional 
characters becomes considerably more complicated when a character is the 
subject of both trademark and copyright protection.  There is a real concern 
that dual protection will “stifl[e] the very creative forces copyright is 
supposed to nurture” by limiting the material available to future authors.235  
At the same time, there is recognition that the nature of the rights conferred 
by copyright and trademark are substantially different, and therefore 
capable of co-existing where properly granted.236  While the majority of the 
issues surrounding dual copyright and trademark protection of fictional 
characters have yet to be resolved or even addressed in a meaningful way 
by the courts, the limited jurisprudence available does provide both 
important insights into how courts may address these issues in the future 
and important mechanisms for determining the appropriate scope of dual 
protection.  
A.  Concurrent Copyright and Trademark Protection  
The life cycle of the intellectual property protection of fictional 
characters can be broken down into two distinct stages.  The first stage 
involves concurrent copyright and trademark protection, while the second 
stage involves trademark protection persisting after the expiration of the 
copyright term.  Of major concern in the first stage is the potential for 
concurrent trademark protection to improperly limit copyright fair use.  
Copyright fair use is a carefully crafted doctrine that endeavors to provide 
an appropriate offsetting balance to the limited monopoly granted under 
copyright.237  Copyright fair use was not developed with an expectation of 
concurrent trademark protection.  Thus, the addition of trademark 
protection can be quite disruptive to this already complicated and 
unpredictable doctrine, as seen in Original Appalachia Artworks Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.238  Topps Chewing Gum manufactured 
“Garbage Pail Kids” trading cards and stickers depicting dolls with 
features “similar to Cabbage Patch Kids dolls in rude, violent and 
frequently noxious settings.”239  Topps claimed that the Garbage Pail Kids 
                                                                                                                          
234 Id.. § 1125(c)(3). 
235 Alex Kozinski, Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 467 (1994). 
236 See infra notes 254–59 and accompanying text. 
237 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (“The fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship or research is not an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
238 Original Appalachia Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034, 
1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986).  
239  Id. at 1032. 
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were a parody of the Cabbage Patch Kids, and therefore protected by 
copyright fair use.240  Dismissing the fair use defense, the court went 
through the motions of evaluating the statutory fair use factors, yet focused 
almost entirely on the economic value and goodwill associated with the 
Cabbage Patch Kids trademarks,241 erroneously importing trademark 
principles into the copyright fair use analysis.     
The Appalachia case also illustrates another important problem that 
arises with concurrent copyright and trademark protection.  Had the 
Appalachia court determined that the defendant’s use of the Garbage Pail 
Kids constituted permissible fair use under copyright, an injunction would 
nevertheless have been issued based on the court’s finding of trademark 
infringement.242  Thus, trademark protection of the Garbage Pail Kids 
would eliminate otherwise permissible copyright fair use.243  In other cases, 
courts have made sophisticated inquiries into the defendant’s particular use 
of the trademark in finding copyright fair use despite the existence of 
trademark protection.244  Such in-depth inquiries, while preferable, have 
been rare.  In the end, concurrent trademark protection may eliminate, or at 
the very least curtail otherwise permissible copyright fair use.  Such a 
limitation is acceptable in light of the public benefits associated with 
trademarks.  However, the ability of trademarks to significantly limit the 
copyright fair use doctrine only underscores the importance of ensuring 
that trademark protection for fictional characters is properly granted from 
the outset. 
B.  Trademark Protection and the Public Domain 
The second stage in the life cycle of a fictional character’s intellectual 
property protection begins when the copyright term expires and trademark 
protection persists.  This stage presents a variety of important issues as the 
use of a fictional character otherwise in the public domain under copyright 
law is indefinitely restricted by trademark protection.  The quid pro quo of 
copyright is often described as the right to copy precisely those works 
whose creation was incentivized by the granting of a limited copyright 
monopoly.  Yet the addition of trademark protection makes such public 
                                                                                                                          
240  Id. at 1034. 
241  Id. at 1036. 
242 Id. at 1039 (“For all the foregoing reasons, the court finds that there is a likelihood of 
confusion as to origin, approval, endorsement or other association of the Garbage Pail Kids' products 
and mark with the plaintiff.”). 
243 Id.  
244 See Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 129–32 (N.D. Ga. 1981) 
(finding permissible copyright fair use where the defendant’s use of the Pillsbury trademark was both 
critical and not intentionally deceiving the public); Reddy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 477 
F. Supp. 936, 948 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding the defendant’s characters generally portraying the electric 
utility industry in a negative light were dissimilar from the overall impression of the defendant’s 
marks). 
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domain works potentially unavailable.  Many scholars argue that “[w]hen 
copyright law relegates a character that functions as a trademark into the 
public domain, the public should be able to employ the character.”245  
Others point to the value of fictional characters with the ability to function 
as trademarks and the potential harm that would result if confusing use of 
characters were permitted.246    
When trademark protection persists after the expiration of a copyright 
term, the passage of a fictional character into the public domain is 
necessarily limited, with the scope of this limitation to be crafted by the 
courts on a case-by-case basis.  In the 1970’s, two important cases 
provided the foundation for the analysis of the trademark/copyright 
divide.247  In Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., the plaintiff-
publisher acknowledged that the copyright term for the books at issue had 
expired.248  Despite this important fact, the publisher sought trademark 
protection for eight illustrations found in the original books.249  The 
defendant argued that its use of the illustrations was permissible simply 
because the illustrations were a “part of the once copyrighted works now in 
the public domain.”250  However, the court did not find the defendant’s 
argument persuasive, stating: 
The fact that a copyrightable character of design has fallen 
into the public domain should not preclude protection under 
the trademark law so long as it is shown to have acquired 
independent trademark significance, identifying in some way 
the source or sponsorship of the goods.  Because the nature of 
the property right conferred by copyright is significantly 
different from that of trademark, trademark protection should 
be able to co-exist and possibly to overlap with copyright 
protection without posing preemption difficulties.251 
Thus, the court recognized the possibility of concurrent trademark and 
copyright protection as well as the possibility of trademark protection 
existing beyond the expiration of a copyright term.  Even more, the court 
noted that, “[d]ual protection under copyright and trademark laws is 
particularly appropriate for graphic representations of characters.”252  
Nevertheless, Warne presented insufficient evidence to support a finding of 
                                                                                                                          
245 Nickles, supra note 130, at 166 & n.147. 
246 Id. at 165. 
247 Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem  Mft. Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1100–11 
(5th Cir. 1975); Frederick Warne & Co. Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196–97 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979).   
248 Frederick Warne, 481 F. Supp. at 1193. 
249 Id.     
250 Id. at 1196.  
251 Id. (citations omitted).  
252 Id. 
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acquired distinctiveness identifying the publisher as the producer or 
sponsor of the goods and as a result, the case was remanded.253   
The Warne court was not alone in recognizing the potential for 
providing both copyright and trademark protection to fictional characters.  
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem 
Manufacturing, the district court held that providing trademark protection 
for the plaintiff’s logo was inappropriate; it was concerned that such 
protection would create a copyright monopoly for uncopyrighted 
designs.254  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, overruling the lower court’s 
opinion and stating specifically that “trademark laws are based on the 
needed protection of the public and business interests, and there is no 
reason why trademarks should ever pass into the public domain by the 
mere passage of time.”255  The court stated further that if:  
[A]n individual selects a word or design that might otherwise 
be in the public domain to represent his business or product . 
. . . [and] that word or design comes to symbolize his product 
or business, . . . the individual acquires a property right in the 
mark.  The acquisition of such a right through use represents 
the passage of a word or design out of the public domain and 
into the protective ambits of trademark law.256  
The result is no different where a fictional character once protected by 
copyright passes into the public domain.  If the fictional character serves a 
trademark function, it will be removed from the public domain in the same 
manner as any other trademark.257  The Fifth Circuit therefore opened the 
door to concurrent copyright and trademark protection of fictional 
characters, and established that such trademark protection would not expire 
at the conclusion of a copyright term.  
While many courts have recognized the possibility of trademark 
protection continuing after the expiration of a copyright term, other courts 
have recognized that once granted, such protection may be problematic.  In 
a special concurrence, Judge Nies expressed her reservations in granting 
trademark registrations to three-dimensional representations of Superman, 
Batman and the Joker.258  Judge Nies was concerned that where a 
“copyrighted doll design is also a trademark for itself, there is a question of 
whether the quid pro quo for the protection granted under copyright has 
                                                                                                                          
253 Id. at 1198.  Decided in 1979, before the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
1995, the Warne court did not specifically address trademark dilution. Nonetheless, the decision also 
did not rule out the possibility of maintaining concurrent and continuing trademark dilution protection.  
254 Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mft. Inc., 360 F. Supp. 459, 464 
(N.D. Tex. 1973), rev’d 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).   
255 Boston Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011.   
256 Id. at 1014.  
257 Id.  
258 In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring).   
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been given, if, upon expiration of the copyright, the design cannot be used 
at all by others.”259  This scenario presents an extreme example, wherein a 
previously copyrighted character that would otherwise be a part of the 
public domain under copyright law is entirely prevented from entering the 
public domain by virtue of trademark law.  In such an instance, the public 
domain is not enriched by even a single element of the previously 
copyrighted work.  Instead, it can be argued that the monopoly granted 
during the copyright term served only to facilitate the copyright owner’s 
development of the acquired distinctiveness necessary for trademark 
protection, and the public receives nothing in exchange for the grant of a 
copyright monopoly.   
The concern expressed by Judge Nies is certainly valid; yet it may also 
be argued that the public has in fact gained something valuable in 
exchange for the grant of a copyright monopoly—the creation of a new 
trademark.  Naturally, the value of the exchange is contingent upon the 
appropriateness of the grant of trademark protection in the first place.  The 
decision to extend trademark protection therefore becomes even more 
essential to ensuring that the quid pro quo of copyright is maintained.  
The limits of trademark protection for previously copyrighted works 
were reached in Comedy III Productions v. New Line Cinema.260  In this 
case, the defendant released the motion picture A Long Kiss Goodnight, 
containing a clip from a Three Stooges short film playing on a television 
set in the background of a scene for less than thirty seconds.261  The 
plaintiff sought damages for violation of the Lanham Act, alleging that the 
clip contained an enforceable trademark “because it [wa]s particularly 
distinctive of ‘The Three Stooges’ comedy, whereas other clips . . . [we]re 
not so distinctive to be trademarks.”262  In denying trademark protection for 
a film clip whose copyright term had expired, the Ninth Circuit recognized 
the broader implications of the plaintiff’s claims:  
[T]he footage at issue here was clearly covered by the 
Copyright Act, . . . and the Lanham Act cannot be used to 
circumvent copyright law.  If material covered by copyright 
law has passed into the public domain, it cannot then be 
protected by the Lanham Act without rendering the 
Copyright Act a nullity.263 
Comedy III thereby reaffirmed the independence of copyright and 
trademark, and demonstrated the unwillingness of courts to allow one to 
improperly supplant the other.  
                                                                                                                          
259 Id. at 1052 n.6.  
260 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000). 
261 Id. at 594. 
262 Id. at 595.  
263 Id.  
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V.  AVOIDING THE PERPETUAL COPYRIGHT 
The Supreme Court recently redefined the boundaries of the 
copyright/trademark divide in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp.264  Twentieth Century Fox held the exclusive television rights to 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s book, Crusade in Europe.  However, Twentieth 
Century Fox failed to renew the copyright in the television series, thereby 
leaving the entire series in the public domain.265  In anticipation of the 
fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Dastar acquired the beta 
cam tapes of the original Fox television series, copied the tapes, and 
released the series with only minor adjustments.266  Dastar sold the tapes as 
its own, making no reference to the original Fox series.267  Fox alleged that 
Dastar’s television series infringed upon Fox’s rights under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act by making a false representation as to the origin of the 
series.268 
The Supreme Court’s decision turned on the statutory interpretation of 
the word “origin” in §43(a) of the Lanham Act.269  Dastar argued that the 
word “origin” included only the manufacturer or producer of the physical 
goods, while Fox argued that the word “origin” included the creator of the 
underlying work.270  In construing the Lanham Act, the Court cautioned 
against the misuse or over extension of trademark into areas traditionally 
occupied by copyright.271  Specifically, the Court was concerned that 
“allowing a cause of action under §43(a) for [Dastar’s] representation 
would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s 
federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights.”272  The Court 
concluded that the term “origin” refers to the “producer of the tangible 
goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, 
or communication embodied in the goods . . . [for] to hold otherwise would 
be akin to finding that §43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and 
copyright, which Congress may not do.”273  Based on this definition of 
                                                                                                                          
264 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003). 
265 Id. at 25–26.  
266 Id. at 26–27. 
267 Id. at 27. 
268 Id. at 29–30.  Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act makes actionable the use of a mark that 
is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection or 
association of such persons with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services or commercial activities.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).  
269 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).   
270 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003).   
271 Id. at 34. 
272 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
273 Id. at 37.   
The consumer who buys a branded product does not automatically assume that 
the brand-name company is the same entity that came up with the idea for the 
product, or designed the product and typically does not care whether it is. The words 
of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no 
consequence to purchasers. 
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“origin,” Dastar had made no false representations as to the origin of the 
goods and therefore did not infringe on Fox’s trademark interests in the 
original television series.   
While the Dastar decision did not directly address intellectual property 
protection of fictional characters, Dastar did clarify that upon expiration of 
a copyright term, there exists an absolute right to copy the work without 
any identification of its creative source.274  This proposition will likely be 
cited by future defendants who copy public domain characters without 
authorization.275  Nonetheless, this over-simplified line of argument will 
fail as Dastar did not object to the mere possibility of copyright and 
trademark protection, but only to the granting of improper protection.276 
The Dastar decision should serve as an important case for fictional 
characters as the Court’s narrow definition of “origin” arguably heightened 
the secondary meaning requirement for fictional characters.  Numerous 
characters are highly recognizable, having some form of secondary 
meaning to the consuming public.  Nonetheless, Dastar requires that the 
character is not merely associated with an author or an illustrator generally, 
but is instead associated with the actual producer or sponsor of the tangible 
goods on which the character appears.277  Dastar therefore serves to 
strengthen the proposition set forth in Warne, which required the contested 
illustrations to indicate the producer of the physical books, the publisher, 
and not simply Beatrix Potter, the author.278  Cases such as DC Comics v. 
Unlimited Monkey Business, where the court found the Superman and 
Wonder Woman characters to constitute protectable trademarks based on 
mere association between the trademark image and the characters 
themselves, are not likely to withstand challenges under Dastar.279   
Trademark protection should not be upheld based on a “convenient 
fiction”280 of source identification.  Dastar specifically requires that a 
character serve as an indicator of the source of the tangible product with 
which it is associated, such that trademark protection should not be granted 
based on mere popularity or general public recognition alone.  Trademark 
protection should only be granted where a fictional character possesses the 
distinct ability to identify the source or sponsor of tangible products, 
namely its ability to serve as a trademark.  
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 32–33.  
274 Id. at 33.  
275 Zissu, supra note 185, at 457. 
276 See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping 
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1522–23 (2004) (noting the Court failed 
to deal with the problems posed by trademark and copyright protection). 
277 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003). 
278 Frederick Warne & Co. Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
279 DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
280 Kurtz, supra note 77, at 444.   
 960 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:921 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Historically, the intellectual property protection provided to fictional 
characters has been riddled with uncertainty.  In copyright law, courts have 
routinely adjusted standards for protection, often confusing the state of the 
law to such a degree that lower courts are forced to analyze the question 
under every possible test to avoid reversal.281  Yet the necessity for 
evaluation of the appropriateness of copyright protection for a given 
character far outweighs any concerns regarding the complexity of the 
analysis or the ability of courts to appropriately conduct it.  Copyright 
protection must not be extended to ideas.  If an intricate analysis is 
required to prevent such an extension, it is justified, and must be conducted 
before the question of substantial similarity is addressed.   
Trademark and unfair competition laws provide several avenues for the 
protection of fictional characters with an ability to serve as indicators of 
source.282  As with copyright protection, it is important that trademark 
protection be extended only where warranted.  Courts have often failed to 
apply the statutory requirements of trademark law in a rigorous and 
principled manner, continually deciding cases based upon the general 
public recognition of a fictional character as opposed to the true source 
identifying nature of the proposed mark.283  Adherence to the statutory 
requirements set forth in the Lanham Act provides numerous methods for 
ensuring that trademark protection is extended only to fictional characters 
that serve the goals of trademark law.  Acquired distinctiveness, single 
source identification and likelihood of confusion standards present 
important obstacles to trademark protection of fictional characters and each 
must be established independently before trademark protection is properly 
granted.284 
The unique ability of fictional characters to serve expressive as well as 
source identifying functions allow protection to be granted under both 
copyright and trademark doctrines.  That said, where copyright and 
trademark protections overlap, copyright fair use is potentially 
compromised.285  Courts should therefore pay particular attention to the 
alleged fair use, focusing on traditional copyright fair use concepts, in 
order to prevent the analysis from becoming subsumed by the public 
recognition of the fictional character.  Where trademark protection persists 
following the expiration of a copyright term, Dastar and Frederick Warne 
                                                                                                                          
281 See supra Parts II.A, B.   
282 See supra Part III.  
283 See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc., 598 F. Supp. at 115, 119–20 (granting plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment where “marks have acquired outstanding celebrity and have obtained virtually 
universal recognition in the United States and throughout the world as unique”).  
284 See infra Parts III.A, B, C (discussing the element of distinctiveness in trademark protection).  
285 See infra Part IV (discussing concurrent trademark and copyright protection).  
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should guide the analysis and help ensure that the public domain is not 
improperly restricted.286  A fictional character must indicate the origin or 
sponsorship of the tangible good to which it is connected to be a proper 
subject of trademark protection.287  Association with the author, the 
original work, or simply the character itself, must not provide the basis 
upon which trademark protection is granted.  The removal of a fictional 
character from the public domain following an expiration of the copyright 
term is only warranted where the fictional character serves the proper 
source identifying function.  In the absence of such an association, 
trademark protection for fictional characters will create nothing more than 
an impermissible, perpetual copyright.     
                                                                                                                          
286 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003); Frederick Warne 
& Co. Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
287 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.  
